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Описание цели, задач и основных 
результатов 
Целью данной статьи является проверить 
корреляцию между резким падением цен на 
нефть в 2014 году с количеством сделок 
слияний и поглощений в нефтегазовой отрасли. 
Помимо фактора цен на нефть мы проверяем, 
есть ли корреляция с факторами спроса и 
предложения. Исследование направлено на 
выявление, как различные типы нефтяных 
компаний реагируют на условия низких цен на 
нефть. Результаты свидетельствуют о том, что 
фактор цены на нефть и фактор мировой 
динамики добычи нефти показывают 
умеренную корреляцию с количеством сделок 
слияний и поглощений, имевших место в 
отрасли. Также обнаружено, национальные 
нефтяные компании практически не участвуют 
в поглощениях. Частные компании 
демонстрируют разную динамику. Наиболее 
активен сегмент мидстрима отрасли. 
Ключевые слова Нефтегазовая отрасль, падение цен на нефть, 
национальные нефтегазовые компании, 
международные нефтегазовые компании, 
слияния и поглощения. 
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Introduction 
Nowadays oil is one of the major resources unless not the most important commodity in 
the global economy. Oil accounts for one third of energy mix of global economy. Companies 
that are in possession of richest oil reserves shape not only the industry dynamics but set the 
trends of world economic development. Petroleum industry is very diverse and is composed of 
players that differ by ownership type (state-owned and private owned companies), by position in 
value chain (upstream, midstream and downstream operators). State-owned companies or NOCs 
the majority of world’s oil reserves and 75% of crude oil output. Private-owned companies can 
be divided into majors (or IOCs) and independent players. These companies are characterized by 
more advanced business model aimed at maximizing shareholder’s value by finding and 
exploring more reserves, while minimizing costs.   
For the past years both NOCs and IOCs were sure that the demand for oil would continue 
to increase, so would the prices for oil. However, the recent changes on the international oil 
market proved these expectations to be wrong. Since 2014 oil prices has plummeted from more 
than $100 per barrel to less than $60. Such dramatic changes in the market conditions leave no 
choice for oil companies but to adjust their strategies. The question of the greatest interest is 
whether industry that faces market uncertainties reacts with restructuring via M&A. Thus, we 
formulate our research problem as follows: How do different types of oil companies use M&A to 
respond to low oil prices? The primary interest of this research is to analyze how national and 
international oil and gas companies (NOCs, IOCs and private oil companies) use takeover to 
react to the unfavorable external conditions, specifically low international oil price. We base our 
research on assumption that M&A is means for oil companies to respond to the market 
alterations caused by oil price decline.  
The paper is aimed to cover the research gap of previous studies that do not provide 
complex study of M&A activity of oil companies in the context of low oil prices and in multiple 
dimensions, namely identification of differences across company types and industry segments. 
To fulfill the goal of this study we will answer the following research questions: 
Ø Does significant relationship between low oil prices and M&A activity in oil and gas 
industry take place?  
Ø What other factors may be related to industry takeover activity?   
Ø Do different types of oil companies show distinct takeover behavior?  
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 To summarize, the topic is of research value for the following reasons: 
Ø Allows us to analyze the contemporary trends of NOCs’ and IOCs’ and private oil 
companies’ M&A activity 
Ø Considering the complement approach, we can trace the tendencies of the whole industry 
Ø Findings of our analysis will allow us to identify responses of different types of oil 
companies in the period of industry shock and bring up implications for industry players. 
 The expected finding of this paper is to illuminate main trends in strategic decision-
making of oil and gas companies in the context of low oil prices. The pre-research hypothesis is 
that industry players use takeovers as means to combat the negative external conditions. We 
expect takeover activity vary among different industry segments (upstream, midstream, 
downstream). 
 The research is organized as follows. Chapter 1 is theoretical background aimed to bring 
brief introduction to petroleum industry, review main reasons behind 2014 oil price shock and 
identify factors that influence M&A activity in the industry. In Chapter 2 we explore our dataset 
and research tactics. Finally, Chapter 3 is devoted to results discussion.   
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Chapter 1. Theoretical background 
Chapter 1 or theoretical background organized thematically. Section 1.1 gives the brief 
introduction to petroleum industry, namely main company types and industry value chain. 
Section 1.2 discovers the reasons behind unexpected drop of oil price in 2014 and gives typology 
of oil price shocks. Section 1.3 is devoted to M&A activity in industry: main drivers and recent 
trend. Also, in this chapter we introduce hypotheses of this study.  
1.1 Introduction to oil and gas industry 
Petroleum industry plays important role in global economy. Oil remains the world’s 
leading fuel, accumulating one third in global energy mix (BP, 2017). The modern oil and gas 
industry consists of vide variety of companies of different size and status. We can distinguish the 
main approaches to analyze the industry structure: by ownership type and by position in industry 
value chain.  
 Ownership type  
Private-owned oil companies: International oil companies (IOCs) and independent 
players  
As defined by Stevens (2016) IOCs are the privately-owned oil and gas companies with 
global operations. So-called “majors”, represented by such giants as BP, ExxonMobil, Chevron 
Texaco, Total, Shell, dominated the industry. At the beginning of the 20th century the privileged 
position of IOCs seemed unshakable. However, starting from the 70s due to the nationalization 
wave in the emerging economies, the influence of private oil companies started to fade. As a 
result, these companies lost the access to the oil reserves and low-cost crude oil. The change in 
the industry balance of power threatens the future of IOCs in several ways: 
Ø Unavailability of low-cost crude oil had far more serious consequences. Upstream cost 
has risen dramatically, and IOCs are forced to operate in new industry conditions. 
Obsession with size and scale led to ignorance of development of smaller fields and loss 
of potential profits (Stevens, 2016).  
Ø Strong demand for oil reserves has changed the perception of what extractable oil is. 
Shale oil and oil sands previously seen as unprofitable undertaking now are increasing 
their share in output. These new opportunities in the industry require technical advances, 
however IOCs are still reluctant to invest in technologies (Bakewell et al., 2005).
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Ø Industry dynamics have changed drastically, recently a lot of independent players have 
appeared: upstream operators, that possess smaller producing assets; midstream and 
service companies that provide technology and oilfield services to the upstream; 
downstream operators that own refineries and distribution chains. These smaller 
companies are usually geographically focused and have a narrower specialization as 
opposed to IOCs (Pelegrinni et al., 2012). 
Petroleum industry has become more diverse. Given the limited access to crude oil 
reserves privately-owned companies have to revise their strategies. Their forte became 
technology and innovation to minimize the extraction cost and to use the existing fields more 
effectively.  
State-owned oil companies: National oil companies (NOCs)  
NOCs are the state-owned enterprises, that have the privileged position in global oil and 
gas industry: these companies possess huge oil and gas reserves and have control over the 
production of crude oil. To verify, 73% of world’s oil reserves and produce 61% of crude oil 
available on the market are accounted to NOCs. Generally, these companies share some 
characteristics such as monopoly over extraction of oil and gas recourses, governmental support, 
key role in economies of their countries. Nevertheless, the role and functions of NOCs may vary. 
Some NOCs are global players as they are extremely successful and profitable (e.g. Saudi 
Aramco, Statoil). The others national companies may mix political and social functions together 
with their commercial activity, and act as political means for their governments (e.g. PDVSA, 
Gazprom). In the most extreme case, NOCs execute the functions of the government, like 
Angola’s Sonangol which primary objective is to regulate the activity of international oil 
companies within the country (Victor et al., 2015).  
 NOCs are mostly concentrated in Middle East, but also present in Africa, Europe, Latin 
America and Asia. Thus, NOCs are global phenomena and operate all over the world. 
Traditionally, any kind of state-owned companies is perceived to be less efficient than their 
private counterparts. In this connection, the following question arises: “What NOCs should even 
exist?”. Victor et al. (2015) answer that question with summarization of the most common 
reasons that support the existence of NOCs:  
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Ø Widely held belief that state ownership allows government to stimulate and have a better 
control over the economic development of the country, support social justice through and 
tax income redistribution. 
Ø NOCs, especially in emerging markets, are seen by governments as effective means to 
win the popular support. In this case, state-owned oil companies are used to please the 
favored groups with jobs. Also, NOCs are used to control the other products and services 
for political reasons. 
Ø The third reason arises from mistrust between local governments and IOCs. The foreign 
enterprises may have their own interests and strategic plans regarding the reserves, that 
not necessarily coincide with the ones of the policymakers. In this connection, the loss of 
control over the fields is perceived as a threat to state security.  
To summarize, although all public oil companies are defined by common term “NOCs”, 
they are not the same. They differ by the interaction with government: operate independently or 
to be used as political tool to manage intragovernmental affairs. NOCs existence is not always 
explained by the profitability of the firms, but primary driven by the necessity to solve social 
issues, to get political support or to ensure the state control over the resources and economic 
development of the country. 
Value chain position 
 Petroleum industry value chain 
 Company’s position in industry value chain is an important element of one’s activity. It 
determines not only competitive advantage of a firm, but also its strategic actions. Traditionally, 
the oil and gas value chain is split up into three main components. Upstream, which includes the 
initial field explorations, development and production. Midstream that refers to infrastructure 
(pipelines, roads, rails, ports) and storage ensure the connection between production and 
processing facilities and consumer. These activities are important during the different stages of 
value chain. Finally, downstream: oil refining and gas processing and into the final products for 
further distribution (World Bank, 2011). 
 Vertical integration 
The companies that are involved in one or more activities along the value chain are called 
vertically integrated. This type of oil companies is supposed to participate in every stage starting 
from extraction and production and finishing with refining and marketing (World Bank, 2011). 
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From industry’s viewpoint vertical integration is an important attribute that has solid advantages. 
It reduces risk and facilitates obtaining of potential profits at every stage of industry value chain. 
Vertical integration helps companies to balance their operations and secures from market 
instability. Profits across segments may vary asymmetrically, e.g. during the periods of low oil 
prices the upstream operations incur losses, whereas downstream enjoys higher margins (Al-
Moneef, 1998).  
 
 
Figure 1. Value chain of oil companies 
Source: World Bank, 2011. 
 Ownership type of oil company has a great impact on a vertical integration. Since 
different company types aim at different objectives their diversification patterns may also differ. 
For example, the majority of NOCs are primary concerned with increase of social value at 
national level. Thus, it is natural to assume, the value chain of state-owned oil and gas tends to 
be integrated and include the stages of development, production, processing, logistics and 
marketing of oil and gas to preserve control over strategic resource. This statement can be 
supported by the evidence observed during industry restructuring observed in the 80’s and early 
90’s caused by ownership changes. At that time NOCs, supported by local governments, actively 
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invested and participated in acquisitions of downstream facilities to anchor their privileged 
positions (Abdalla, 1995).  
Due to drastic changes in industry dynamics private-owned oil companies were separated 
from their upstream sector in the emerging markets. The companies were left with no access to 
world’s biggest (and cheapest) extraction projects and limited growth opportunities. In new 
market environment IOCs adjusted their business strategies and firstly, concentrated on 
investment in fields of developed countries or/ and offshore and secondly, involved in further 
diversification of energy sector (Grant, Cibin, 1996). 
To sum up, ownership type and position in industry value chain matter a lot for oil and 
gas companies. Players are aimed at vertical integration to reduce risk and balance profits that 
fluctuate asymmetrically across different business sectors. Thereby, NOCs, that are traditionally 
upstream operators, expand into downstream. Private-owned companies, on the contrary, are 
searching for smaller opportunities in upstream. The question may arise: “Where midstream and 
service operators expand to?”. This was answered by Barreau (2002), who says the companies 
have demonstrated tendency towards consolidation.      
1.2 Oil price shock of 2014 
 Currently oil and gas industry faces the extremely unfavorable market conditions: 
between the June 2014 and January 2015 oil price sharply declined from $114 to $46, which is 
approximately 60% decrease. Currently we observe on of the most rapid and deepest oil price 
shocks in industry history. The theory on oil price shocks are is well developed in academic 
literature. Killian (2009), Peersman and Robays (2012) divide oil price shocks into those that are 
driven by fundamentals (supply and demand) and non-fundamentals.  
 Oil supply shocks 
 These type of shocks results from the sudden changes in global oil production. Oil supply 
curve shifts to the left, and consequently oil price and oil production move in different directions. 
The situation may result from the military conflict or changes in the production quotas. Impact of 
supply shocks depends on the amount of crude oil physically available on the market. In case of 
shortage of crude oil, exporters and importers react differently. Cashin et al. (2014) argue oil-
importing countries suffer from prolonged economy decline. The reaction among the oil 
producers, however, depends on the amounts of the reserves. It seems countries with large 
amounts of oil continue to increase their output, while their counterparts with limited oil reserves 
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slowdown the production. In more recent study Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016) contribute that if 
the world’s major oil producer decreases its output the shortage of crude oil on the market is 
unlikely to be compensated by other exporters. In this scenario, the change in supply of the top-
producer will result in global economy slowdown.  
Oil demand shocks 
These are driven by changes in demand. In this case oil production and oil price move in 
the same direction. According to Bastianin et al. (2016) for the period of 1975-2015 demand was 
key factor in oil price fluctuations. The increasing aggregate demand for oil, originated from 
boost of economic activity and higher demand in commodities, pushed oil prices up, but 
eventually ended in slowdown of global economy. Of course, the situation is beneficial to the oil 
producers, but their reaction differs and depends on the oil reserves and weather the country is 
OPEC member or not. In general, non-OPEC countries tend not to react to the aggregate demand 
shocks. However, the two countries do not follow this behavioral trend: Mexico and Russia 
significantly increase their supply., the OPEC nations (mostly the Gulf countries) increase the 
production to get bigger revenue streams as their budgets are highly dependent on oil exports 
(Güntner, 2014). 
Oil-specific 
The previously mentioned researches argue that fluctuations of oil price are mostly 
influenced by changes in global oil demand and supply. Zhang and Yao (2016), however offer a 
different approach. Authors suggest that oil price volatility is a complicated issue and can be 
influenced by other non-fundamental factors namely geopolitics in major oil-extracting regions, 
speculations regarding oil futures and US dollar exchange rate. When non-fundamental factors 
determine oil price, the price fluctuation is not supported by shifts in supply and demand curves 
and so bubble emerges. Thus, the authors propose bubble to be another driver behind oil price 
increase during period of 2001-2008. 
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Figure 2. Crude oil price for the period 2013-2017 
Source. Nasdaq. 
 
Based on this background, what are the factors that led to such an unexpected oil price 
crush in June 2014? The experts have actively discussed on the topic.  
Arezki and Blanchard (2014) suggest it was due fundamentals, namely supply side. The 
price for oil reported to be high despite the oversupply on market. Several factors contributed to 
the situation. For instance, Libyan oil production recovered faster than expected and Iraq output 
did not decrease despite political instability in the country. Additionally, OPEC has decided not 
to reduce collective output and preserve production level of 30 mb/d. Continuing the discussion 
on the supply side, Manesco and Nuno (2015) conclude, that although shale oil producers have 
added approximately 3.9% to total oil output, shale oil revolution still did little drop of oil prices. 
The researchers emphasize that since the event was anticipated it was incorporated into oil price 
fluctuations. Baumeister and Kilian (2015), on their side, add that cumulative effect of adverse 
demand shock, resulted from slowdown of global economy, also explain oil price drop.  
Reflecting upon possible outcomes from the situation Mohaddes and Pesaran (2017) conclude 
that response of oil suppliers will vary. Non-OPEC nations will decrease their output, while 
cartel member may not react due to political reasons.  
 Another cohort of the researchers assign the changes to be due to non-fundamentals. For 
example, Tokic (2015) presents a viewpoint that volatility USD/EUR exchange rates caused oil 
The sharp decrease 
of crude oil price 
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price shock. In more recent study (Fantazzini, 2016) the argument towards non-fundamental 
factors was supported with empirical evidence of negative financial bubble. 
 To conclude, the recent sharp decline of oil prices appeared as unexpected event for the 
industry. Although, the experts still have not reached consensus regarding the reasons (whether 
fundamental or not), but one statement stays solid: industry players have to adjust to the new 
market conditions.     
 
 Figure 3. Drivers of 2014 oil price shock 
Source. Summarized by author. 
 
To ensure the future survival, the oil companies should primary focus on sustainable 
profitability. The operations should be adjusted in accordance with different price scenarios. 
Capital efficiently will become the key element of corporate strategy for oil companies in the 
upcoming years. The previous prosperous years made it available for major companies to 
participate simultaneously in multiple operating activities like combining onshore production 
with extraction on remote fields while not having the required capabilities. The trends suggest, 
that in future more narrow specialization will take place. The business model of oil companies 
will be built around specific capabilities. This leads to the evolution of oil and gas sector. 
However, the transition to new industry architecture may not be easy for some NOCs that prefer 
complete control over the all assets and production stages. In the changing industry environment 
portfolio management should be revised to ensure the coherence with company’s capabilities. In 
the future M&A and divestment activities should not be undertaken only to generate more cash. 
The coherence with organization’s capabilities and specialization will become the main rationale 
Drivers of 2014 oil price 
shock
Fundamental
Supply
Unexpectedly 
high output of 
Iraq and Lybia
OPEC's decision 
not to reduce 
quotas
Demand Slowdown of global economy
Non-
fundamental
USD/EUR 
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behind portfolio evaluation. The new industry trend will become the opportunity for the 
companies to divest the noncore assets to adjust the company strategy (PwC, 2017).       
 
1.3 M&A activity in oil and gas industry  
General reasons behind M&A 
The theory of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is well-studied in academic literature. 
What are the triggers for takeovers? The variety of answers exists to that question, we introduce 
the main rationale for M&A.    
Market power 
According to the market power theory companies merge to enlarge their market share not 
necessarily increasing firm’s efficiency or quality of product or service. There is an empirical 
support for proposition that companies acquire to gain market power. The example of airline 
industry illustrated that during the studied period merged companies increase airfares more 
essentially as compared to the control group (Kim and Singal, 1993). The more recent evidence 
from banking sector confirmed the findings of aforementioned researchers. Poghosyan and Haan 
(2010) have proved that foreign banks prefer to choose as their target comparatively sizable and 
efficient banks in developing economies to increase the market power of target.    
Efficiency improvement 
 Efficiency theory is based on a proposition that efficient companies will target inefficient 
ones to transfer their more advanced skills and managerial practices. The motivation, thus, is to 
improve operations of newly acquired subsidiary. As a result, the company becomes more 
profitable and competitive. Lanine and Vennet (2007) claim that companies operating in low-
margin markets are more tending to expand. In this case their rationale is either export their skills 
to weaker industry players or aim at entering high-margin markets to secure their profitability in 
long-run. The empirical evidence from U.S. telecommunication industry (Okoegualea and 
Loveland, 2017) suggests that mergers produce significantly positive returns to merged firms. 
Moreover, acquired firms earn greater profits than their non-target rivals.     
 Resource purchase 
 King, Slotegraaf and Kesner (2008) suggest that M&A is used as means for companies to 
obtain technology resources. In this scenario target’s R&D act as substitute for acquirer’s R&D. 
In other words, target’s R&D with solid investment will generate a greater value for acquirer. 
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Thus, the firms that experience absence of certain technical skills tend to search target company 
that will satisfy the need. The recent addition to the theory (Choi and McNamara, 2018) suggests 
that acquiring companies seek for ways to amalgamate target’s knowledge into their knowledge 
capital to strengthen and extend their innovation activities.          
 Transaction cost 
 According to the transaction cost theory companies decide to acquire to reduce 
transaction cost that arising in following situations (Hennart, 1991): 1) when company needs to 
get access to the other firm’s intermediate products, which are of high transaction cost; 2) when 
company needs other firm’s resources; 3) when company expands outside its domestic market 
and needs knowledge how to sell and operate on foreign market. 
 Resource dependence 
 Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) explain resource dependence to be the reason behind 
mergers and acquisition. The resource dependence causes the emergence of power imbalance 
and appearance of struggling dyad. The dependent actor will seek for the opportunities 
(including restructure activities) to reduce uncertainty and improve its conditions. Although, the 
desire does not necessarily coincide with the ability to do so. On the other hand, the most 
powerful actor will try to preserve the status-quo.    
  Acquisition behavior 
 In general, acquisition behavior theory is based on proposition that previous acquiring 
experience increases the likelihood of subsequent takeovers. Haleblian, Kim, and Rajagopalan 
(2006) have not only provided empirical evidences to the theory but introduced performance 
factor as predictor of future behavior. The new addition suggests that likelihood of takeover 
increases when both experience and performance are positive. In other words, high acquisition 
experience and performance indicate the firm that it has established a reliable pattern to exercise 
successful takeovers. On the contrary, poor takeover performance and prior acquisition 
experience questions the management’s belief in takeovers, thus decreasing firm’s likelihood to 
merge. The study of South-North acquisitions (i.e. cross-border acquisitions of firms from 
emerging economies into developed economies) conducted by (Rabbiosi, Elia, Bertoni, 2012) 
has brought up organizational learning perspective. The results illustrate that emerging market 
firms exercise takeovers in developed markets in an increasing manner. Takeover experience in 
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developed markets increases the likelihood of subsequent expansions as compared to M&A 
activity in developing markets that demonstrates little to no effect.    
 Industry shock 
The pool of researches argues that context, namely industry shock, may also influence the 
takeover activity. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) define industry shock as expected or unexpected 
factor that provokes reshaping of industry structure. Their key assumption is that significant 
changes in technologies, government regulation, and demand and supply conditions alter the 
number and size of the firms in industry. Companies that face industry shock may react in two 
ways: internally or externally (expansion via takeovers). The empirical study included analysis 
of takeover activity 1,064 companies in 51 industries in the USA for the period of 1982-1989 has 
provided evidence that M&A activity significantly increased. Moreover, on average 50% of the 
takeovers tend to cluster within specific range of the studied period suggesting that the same 
factors affect M&A activity in an industry.  While Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) mainly discuss 
industry specific factors e.g. deregulation, energy price volatility, increase in foreign 
competition, etc., Qiu and Zhou (2007) claim M&A may be driven by fundamentals (or changes 
in supply and demand). Researchers have concluded that negative demand shocks are trigger for 
takeover activity. Mergers occur when the demand falls below a critical level, to stabilize the 
market firms start consolidating to restore the equilibrium.  
 
M&A activity in oil and gas industry during the low prices 
In mid-2014 the oil prices plummet resulted in the most dramatic decline of oil and oil 
and gas industry over the decade. Oil prices dropped from more than 100$ per barrel to 26$ per 
barrel, but with oil price about 70$ per barrel the slight recovery takes place. However, the 
overall situation has threatened profitability of the oil and gas companies. In the new unfavorable 
market conditions oil firms will have to find to improve their performance. The new industry 
architecture, as it was discussed before, requires cost and operational efficiency. M&A can be 
one a means to adapt to the new realities.  
In the previous section, we discovered that the general trend suggests that takeover 
activity increases when the industry faces a shock. Thus, our primary interest is to find whether 
in oil and gas industry there is an effect on M&A activity.  
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Geographic trends 
Xie, Reddy, & Liang (2017) argue that with the drop of crude oil prices the takeover 
activity in oil and gas industry noticeably increased. Based on the sample of 150 large-scale (bid 
more than US $1 billion) acquisition transaction with accumulative value of US$535 billion for 
the period of 2005-2015 authors claim that firms from the emerging economies like China and 
Russia has illustrated the blooming activity in M&A deals accounting 41 deals worth over 
US$166 billion. This trend suggests that companies from emerging markets actively compete on 
the global markets. Interestingly enough, that the reasoning of emerging oil importers (China, 
India) and oil exporters (NOCs of Middle East and Asia) is rather different. The former is 
obviously taking advantage of the low oil prices to diversify their energy risk by investing 
worldwide. They intensively expand into resource rich regions of North and South America, 
Africa. While the oil exporters implement internationalization strategies to fund their ambitious 
internal industrialization and infrastructure projects.  
Figure 5. Oil and gas sector M&A deals mapped against oil prices (2013-2016) 
 Source. Deloitte, 2017. 
 
Sectoral trends 
Two interesting observations may be observed from the Figure 5. Firstly, there is a 
relationship between oil prices and M&A activity (Deloitte, 2017). At the beginning of 2016 the 
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two reached its’ minimum for the four-year period. The mega-deals started only to reappear 
when prices stabilized at $50 per barrel. Secondly, the M&A activity shifted along industry value 
chain. If prior the oil price shock, M&A deals mostly occurred in upstream, currently the 
takeover activity is observed mostly in midstream.  
The midstream became the champion of M&A deals in 2016. The possible reasons for 
such a pivot in industry takeover activity may suggest that in the context of low oil prices the 
organic growth opportunities in the segment are limited. Also, the lower extraction activity in the 
upstream threatens the performance of midstream companies.  
Previous research on topic and empirical evidence lead us to proposition that low oil price is 
an indirect factor that affects M&A in oil and gas industry. The next step of current research is to 
identify to which extent low oil prices influence the volume of M&A in the industry. Table 1 
summarizes the previous research on takeover activity in oil and gas industry. We identified 
several research gaps that will be covered in the upcoming sections.  
Ø Global evidence. The majority of the research lack the global evidence. The study of 
national oil and gas industry may not be representative for world-wide scale. At the same 
time acquisition patterns of oil exporters and importers may vary. We intend to highlight 
these differences.  
Ø Timing. The vast papers in the field are mostly focusing on periods of constantly rising 
oil prices, which was justified by industry growth. But current oil price drop is one of the 
most drastic industry shocks in the history, which makes companies’ reaction a 
particularly interesting subject to study.  
Ø Difference across different company types. As was covered in previous session 
ownership type traditionally has a great impact on strategy of oil companies. However, 
the factor of ownership in company’s acquisition behavior was not previously covered, 
apart the studies on industry restructuring in the 90’s.   
Ø Difference across different segments. The current low oil price period revealed some 
trend that M&A activity has shifted along industry value chain. We want to justify 
whether there is an evidence of abnormal takeover activity in different segments of 
industry value chain.  
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Table 1.  M&A in oil and gas industry: previous academic researches 
No Journal Year, No Author  Article Conclusions 
1 Energy 
Economics 
2007, 29 M. M. Boyer, 
D. Filion 
 
Common and 
fundamental factors in 
stock returns of 
Canadian oil and gas 
companies 
The authors studied the financial 
determinants of Canadian O&G 
company stock returns. The key 
finding is that most of the value of 
O&G companies comes from the 
oil price, the factor the firms cannot 
influence.    
2 Energy 
Economics 
2010, 32 L. Granier,  
M. Podesta 
 
Bundling and Mergers in 
Energy Markets 
Study M&A in energy industry (i.e. 
gas and electricity providers). The 
main merger incentive between the 
companies of different sectors is to 
achieve bundling strategy.  
3 Energy 
Economics 
2011, 33 I. Henriques, 
P. Sadorsky 
 
The effect of oil price 
volatility on strategic 
investment 
Oil price volatility has a strong 
impact on O&G company’s 
strategic investment. In the 
increased uncertainty the 
investment activity is decreasing as 
it becomes more reasonable to wait 
until the uncertainty is resolved. 
Thus, the strategic investment is 
postponed. However, the following 
increases in uncertainty stimulates 
the investment as the risk of not 
growing becomes higher.   
4 Energy 
Economics 
2013, 37 A. Ng,  
H. Donker 
 
Purchasing reserves and 
commodity market 
timing as takeover 
motives 
in the oil and gas 
industry 
A sample of M&A deals on O&G 
industry in Canada from 1990 to 
2008 illustrated that companies in 
the sector have a different 
motivation for the takeovers. The 
key motivation in the sector is to 
acquire reserves as it is the main 
component of firm’s value in the 
long-term because reserves are 
finite and increase in value over 
time. Also, commodity prices have 
a strong influence on takeover 
activity in O&G industry opposing 
to generally accepted view that 
stock prices are the major 
motivator.    
5 Energy 
Economics 
2017, 65 K. Hsu,  
M. Wright,  
Z. Zhu 
What motivates merger 
and acquisition activities 
in the upstream oil & gas 
sectors in the U.S.? 
The M&A in upstream oil and gas 
industry differs from traditional 
M&A activity. The empirical 
results illustrated that stock market 
performance did not statistically 
correlate with M&A activity in the 
upstream sector of the U.S. O&G 
sector. Industry specific variables 
as oil prices have much more 
influence on the takeover activity. 
This is explained by the core 
significance of commodity prices 
that determine the value of 
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company’s assets which is 
composed from the value of its 
reserves. The production growth 
also has the positive effect on 
M&A activity, as from company’s 
perspective the increased 
production is an indicator of the 
volume and value of the reserves.  
6 Renewable 
and 
Sustainable 
Energy 
Reviews 
2017, 72 K.S. Reddy, 
E. Xie 
Cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions by oil 
and gas multinational 
enterprises: Geography-
based view of energy 
strategy 
With the drop of oil prices, the 
takeover activity in O&G industry 
has increased. Based on the sample 
of 150 large-scale acquisition 
transaction for the period of 2005-
2015 authors claim that firms from 
the emerging economies (has 
illustrated the blooming activity in 
M&A deals. The second finding is 
that the reasoning of emerging oil 
importers and oil exporters is 
different. Importers are taking 
advantage of the low oil prices to 
diversify their energy risk by 
investing worldwide, while 
exporters implement 
internationalization strategies to 
fund national projects.  
7 Energy 
Economics 
2018, 71 M. Bos,  
R. Demirer,  
R. Gupta,  
A. K. Tiwari 
 
Oil returns and volatility: 
The role of mergers and 
acquisitions 
 
M&A activity in O&G industry has 
a predictive power over oil returns 
and volatility. Thus, takeover 
activity indicates valuable 
information regarding the future 
expectations on oil price 
fluctuations.   
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 1.4 Hypotheses statement 
Although, the literature on M&A in oil and gas industry is limited, the researchers have 
reached a consensus that takeover in oil and gas industry is influenced by industry specific factor  
Oil price volatility 
As proved by Boyer and Filion (2007) the value of oil and gas companies comes from the 
oil price, the factor the firms cannot control. This finding was taken into further development. If 
the value of the firm depends on commodity prices, thus the volatility can have an impact on 
strategic investment in the industry. The latest addition to question of relationship between 
takeover activity and oil prices is illustrating contrariwise perspective. Not only oil prices 
influence takeover activity in industry, but M&A activity itself has a predictive power over oil 
returns and volatility, it as it indicates valuable information regarding the future expectations on 
oil price fluctuations (Bos et al., 2018).  
Some researchers have introduced timing concept into interrelation of oil price volatility 
and industry M&A activity. Henriques and Sadorsky (2011) concluded that when the uncertainty 
regarding oil prices is increasing, the investment activity decreases. In this situation companies 
presume it to be more reasonable to wait until the uncertainty is resolved, meaning the firms 
postpone their strategic investments. However, if the uncertainty continues to increase, the 
unfavorable market conditions eventually stimulate companies to acquire, since the risk of not 
growing becomes greater. This conclusion is supported by empirical evidence of more recent 
research. It has been revealed that oil price has a lagged effect on takeover activity in the 
industry, as companies need time to arrange and close a deal (Sopta and Uremovic, 2016). 
Considering the importance of oil price volatility on takeover activity in oil and gas industry and 
taking into account timing effect, we introduce hypothesis as follows: 
 
 H1: The relationship between sharp decline of oil prices and M&A activity in oil and gas 
industry appears with a lagged affect.  
 
Reserves 
 One of the key M&A motivations in industry is to acquire reserves. Since oil and gas are 
not renewable sources of energy, the companies are exposed to risk of reserves depletion. The 
entire industry is designed the way that to remain competitive the company must constantly 
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invest in the oil reserves exploration. Additionally, reserves are the main component of firm’s 
value in the long-term as the assets is finite and increases in value over time (Ng and Donker, 
2013). So, the reserves are the matter of survival and sustainability: the bigger reserves the 
company possesses, the more secure the future revenue streams. Takeover is a good strategic 
option for large oil companies to reduce the risk and cost of exploration of undeveloped fields by 
acquiring other companies that have already explored undeveloped fields. Thus, we set the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H2: The higher level of world crude oil reserves, the more M&A deals occur in industry. 
 
 Oil production 
Hsu, Wright & Zhu (2017) claim that oil prices is not the only industry specific variable 
that influences industry takeover activity. Although, commodity prices determine the value of 
company’s assets (which is the value of its reserves), the empirical evidence illustrate that oil 
production has the positive effect on M&A activity. This can be explained by a fact that from 
company’s perspective the increased oil production is an indicator of increasing volume and 
value of firm’s assets. Thus, we propose that:  
 
H3: The higher world crude oil production, the more M&A deals occur in industry. 
 
Other factors 
In academia researchers discus other reasons for oil companies to acquire, e.g. execution 
of bundle strategies (Granier and Podesta, 2010) in energy sector to combine, for instance, 
electricity and gas companies in firm’s portfolio to succeed better competitive position. 
Geographic diversification is built on necessity to reduce risk by dispersing it among numerous, 
unrelated revenue streams and also getting exit to the markets and suppliers. Also, investors’ 
assumption regarding the future tax and regulatory policy also can intensify takeover activity. If 
the higher tax rates are expected, the process of M&A deals can be accelerated (Capstone, 2013).     
To summarize, oil and gas companies are subjected both to general and industry specific 
M&A driver. Still, the researchers conclude that takeover activity in oil and gas sector is mostly 
triggered by industry specific factors such as the amount of reserves available to the company, 
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oil prices, etc. The firm’s competitiveness and performance are, in fact, dependent on the finite 
resource of energy which limits the organic growth and forces the companies to seek for the 
expansion. M&A in oil and gas sector is the effective and cost-efficient solution to get access to 
the new oil fields, financial leverage, technologies and markets.  
 
Figure 4. Classification of M&A drivers. 
Source. Summarized by author. 
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Chapter 2. Research strategy: exploring dataset and hypothesis 
2.1 Research strategy 
The research problem is defined as follows: How do different types of oil companies use 
M&A to respond to low oil prices? In this research, we are primary aimed at identifying the main 
trends in oil and gas industry, regarding which factors influence intensity of M&A activity, 
whether takeover behavior differs on company type or company’s position in value chain. Thus, 
the research type applied in the paper is explanatory.  
 The main focus will be given to quantitative methods of statistical analysis: descriptive 
statistics and hypothesis testing.   
Given the specifics of this paper the Zephyr database is used as the primary source of 
data. Zephyr is database by the Bureau van Dijk (BvD) company specializing in business 
information. Zephyr provides an access to huge data collection of M&A deals. The system 
allows to get the information about companies involved in takeover. The advanced system of 
preferences allows the user to customize the query. The additional variables like deal status, 
value of the deal, industry of the companies, financial performance indicators, shareholders 
information, etc. can be added to table layout to display the information needed for the specific 
purpose.        
 
2.2 Research tactics 
Considering the topic of the research the collected data is the list of M&A deals during 
time period 2014-present times, as the dramatic decline of oil prices occurred in June 2014. 
Variables added to customize the query.  
US SIC Industry Classification. Zephyr database collects the information about all announced 
M&A deals. The focus of the research the takeovers in oil and gas industry, so all classification 
codes that included key words ‘oil’, ‘gas’, ‘petroleum’ were selected. We are aware that the 
companies operating in these industries represent the different stages of industry value chain: 
upstream, midstream, downstream. This information also represents an interest for the research.     
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Table 2.  Selected US CIS Industry Classifications Codes 
US SIC Code Industry Description 
1311 Crude petroleum and natural gas 
1381 Drilling oil and gas wells 
1382 Oil and gas field exploration services 
1389 Oil and gas field services, not elsewhere 
classified 
2911 Petroleum refining 
3533 Oil and gas field machinery and equipment 
4922 Natural gas transmission 
4923 Natural gas transmission and distribution 
4924 Natural gas distribution 
4932 Gas and other services combined 
5171 Petroleum bulk stations and terminals wholesale 
dealing in 
5172 Petroleum and petroleum products wholesalers, 
except bulk stations and terminals 
    
Deal Value. The deals selected are of the value starting from $100 million, enough to be 
considered noticeable event in the industry. The initial desire to consider only mega-mergers 
(>$1 billion) was withdrawn. The number of bog players in oil and gas industry is limited and 3-
year-period is not enough to analyze game-changing acquisitions.  
Deal Status. The deal status was chosen to ‘completed’. We are mostly interested in approved 
and completed takeovers as opposed to ‘rumored’ and ‘suspended’. 
Country Code & Region. The geographical position is important for identifying the patterns (if 
any) in acquirer – target dynamics.  
Controlling Shareholder Name and Type. The main interest of the research is to identify the 
difference in responses to oil price shock of NOCs and IOCs. Unfortunately, Zephyr database 
does not have ownership type classification (privately-owned / state-owned), however there is a 
solution to display the information about CSH and its type. This option is suitable to identify 
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NOCs, as the key stock owner is classified as ‘Public authority, State, Government’ (for private 
companies the final owner may be ‘Industrial company’, ‘Bank’, ‘Individuals’, etc.).   
2.3 Exploring dataset 
As the result of a query, we exported the dataset of more than 1,000 M&A deals in oil 
and gas industry for the period June 2014 - November 2017. The originally volume of 
transactions was then decreased to 655 as filter for Deal Type was applied. We excluded the 
cases which were characterized as ‘share buyback’, ‘capital increase’ and ‘minor stake’.  
The final sample includes the information about 655 takeovers in oil and gas industry. 
The minimum deal US$ value is $100 million (the filter originally applied in the query), the 
maximum value is $1,300 billion, thus, the average deal value is around $14 billion. The mega-
mergers (>$1 billion) represent 268 deals or 41%. The main finding, however, was to discover 
that the majority of deals (44%) lie in a range between ($100-500 million). That illustrates the 
situation in the industry, when small oil and gas companies consolidate during low oil prices.  
 
Figure 6. M&A Deal Value, US$ grouped by value range 
 
A closer look on acquirer-target dynamics revealed the following results. The most active 
acquiring countries are USA (285 deals, 43%), Canada (91 deals, 13%) and Australia (23 deals, 
3.5%). Each of the other countries accumulate less than 3% of deal volume. The full table of 
acquiring countries can be found in Appendix 1.   
 
41%
15%
44%
>$1B 500M-1B 100-500M
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Figure 7. Frequency of M&A deals by acquiring country 
 
Regarding the targets, the results are similar. The most frequent target countries are USA 
(292 deals, 45%), Canada (94 deals, 14%), China (35 deals, 5%) and Australia (20 deals, 3%).  
The rest of the countries rarely act as targets. The target list resulted with 647 cases (in the 
contrast to 655 deals), the missing cases are explained by the fact that some targets are 
undisclosed and marked as “unnamed assets”. The full table of target countries can be found in 
Appendix 2.   
   
 
Figure 8. Frequency of M&A deals by target country 
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 Closer look on acquire-target interrelations revealed that the majority of M&A 
transactions occurs within national borders. Thus, oil and gas companies in the context of 
extremely low oil prices prefer to consolidate on national basis by acquiring assets of small local 
companies, instead of going international. The exceptional activity of USA, Canada and 
Australia in takeover transactions indicates consolidation of shale oil producers, which will 
strengthen their positions and give a challenge to conventional oil producers. The highlight of 
strategic responses of shale oil producers is not a research question of this paper. However, it is a 
possible topic for a different research.  
With respect to company types involved in M&A activity (summarized in Table 2), 
privately-owned oil and gas companies are responsible for about 93% of M&A transactions. 
Such dynamism is explained by the structure of industry. NOCs controlling the majority of the 
worlds reserves, give private-owned companies little opportunities for the organic growth. Thus, 
the timing becomes crucially important factor for expansion. Low oil prices that decreases the 
value of assets of oil producers make them more accessible for a takeover. NOCs, in return, are 
seeking for means to decrease the operation costs, which requires expertise that may be provided, 
for example, by service companies.   
 
Table 2. The number of acquirers by company type 
Acquirer company type No Deals % 
Private 607 92,7% 
Majors 20 3,1% 
Independent 587 89,6% 
NOC 46 7,0% 
Government  2 0,3% 
Total 655 100,0% 
  
 However, if we take a closer look on how value is distributed among different company 
types (Figure 9) we can clearly see that average deal value of major oil companies at least 3.5 
times exceeds deal value of counterparts. Such a drastic difference is explained by two factors: 1) 
major oil companies are those that historically have been the biggest industry players (the 
successors of so-called “Seven Sisters” that dominated the industry throughout 20th century) with 
global presence; 2) these companies are vertically integrated, their position in industry value 
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chain allows them to mitigate the risk and compensate asymmetry in profits even during market 
uncertainty.      
 
Figure 9. Average deal value by company type 
Finally, analyzing takeover activity in different segments of petroleum value chain we 
discovered that upstream and midstream segments accumulate 72% of all target companies. The 
second notable observation is that companies also exercise diversification strategies: 13% of all 
targets were classified as ‘Other’, meaning the target company does not operate in petroleum 
industry (Figure 10). The closer look on segment dynamics revealed that in yearly dynamics the 
share of midstream and service providers is gradually increasing (from 28 to 46%). The growing 
attractiveness of this segment illustrates companies’ interest in obtaining latest technologies or 
facilities that will cut cost along value chain. One more notion is that upstream assets are second 
most frequent acquisition, which that during the period of industry shock extracting assets 
become advantageous object for a takeover due to its decreasing value (Figure 11).  
 
$9B
$21B
$74B
Private Independent NOC Private Major
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Figure 10. Deal count by company type 
 
 
Figure 11. Deal count by segment 
 
Acquirer segment – target segment matrix (Table 3) confirms the previously discussed 
observations. All company types demonstrate similar takeover behavior by acquiring assets in 
midstream and upstream segments. We can clearly observe that companies moving towards 
vertical integration. Upstream providers, however, prefer to accumulate resources, almost half of 
the deals are occurring within the segment, revealing consolidation of oil operators. Vertical 
integrated companies, in turn, diversify beyond the core business to lower their dependency on 
oil prices. 
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Table 3. Acquirer segment – target segment matrix 
 
Upstream Downstream Midstream 
Vertically 
Integrated Other 
Upstream 46% 6% 30% 3% 15% 
Midstream 36% 17% 30% 3% 15% 
Downstream 33% 14% 40% 5% 8% 
Vertical Integrated 26% 17% 28% 3% 26% 
Other 35% 18% 35% 3% 10% 
 
The observation on company-segment (Table 4) illustrates that NOCs are aimed at 
upstream assets to increase their book reserves and midstream operations to access latest 
technological advances or infrastructure facilities to decrease their cots. Majors show more 
interest in the midstream segment since these types of companies are interested in grand 
extraction projects and minor operating assets do not fall into their scope of interest. The latter is, 
however, opposite for smaller private oil companies. Our dataset provided evidence that small 
fields (mainly located in U.S. and Canada) attract local operators.  
 
  Table 4. Acquirer company type – target segment matrix 
 
 
Upstream Downstream Midstream 
Vertically 
Integrated Other 
NOC 37% 2% 39% 4% 17% 
Private - Major 35% 15% 50% - - 
Private – Indep. 37% 15% 31% 3% 14% 
 
2.3 Methodology 
Introduction of variables 
 The choice of variables directly follows from hypothesis framing. Thus, we remind the 
initial propositions.  
 
H1: The relationship between sharp decline of oil prices and M&A activity in oil and gas 
industry appears with a lagged affect. 
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As it was previously discussed, oil and gas industry is sensitive to oil price fluctuations. 
Various researches are devoted to the establishing the correlation between volatile oil prices and 
number of M&A transactions in industry. The weak spot is that the previous studies are mostly 
focused on the period of constantly rising oil prices. Thus, the uphold opinion is that takeover 
activity (both number of deals and deal value) in the industry is associated with oil price 
increase. We, in turn, introduce the opinion that dramatic decline in oil prices is also a factor that 
can influence M&A activity in the industry. However, it is also a question how much time it 
takes for the companies to react to drop in oil prices. M&A is a complicated process for both 
sides, even given the extreme changes in the market, it is logical to assume that it takes time to 
arrange and announce the deal.  
Variable a: M&A monthly deal counts, retrieved from the dataset. 
Variable b: Crude oil price. But natural question arises: What price to take? We will test  
Ø Average spot price of Brent, Dubai and West Texas Intermediate, equally weighed, 
US$ per barrel.  
Ø Brent crude oil spot price, US$ per barrel.  
Ø West Texas Intermediate oil price, US$ per barrel. 
 The idea is to discover which price type has the strongest correlation with M&A deal 
counts. Prices are taken for the period June 2013 – November 2017. Retrieved from 
indexmundi.com. Oil price data is deliberately taken with excess of one year to set the stage for 
variable transformation, namely creation of lagged variables.  
    
H2: The higher level of world crude oil reserves, the more M&A deals occur in industry. 
 
Oil prices indeed one of the major, but not the only factor that affects M&A in oil 
industry. Getting access to reserves is the key driver for oil companies to acquire. However, for 
the period 2014-2016 world proven crude oil reserves increased only for 0.1%, from 1,490 to 
1,492 million barrels (OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2017), which is not a substantial rise 
that can correlate with takeover activity in the industry. Thus, we reject H2.  
 
H3: The higher world crude oil production, the more M&A deals occur in industry. 
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The hypothesis is based on empirical research of Hsu, Wright and Zhu (2017), who 
concluded that production is a factor that can explain trend of M&A counts. Increases in 
production signals the potentially increases in value of the company’s assets which makes target 
more attractive for the buyer. The original research questions whether production or production 
growth rate is a better factor. The authors conclude that growth rate better describes variation in 
number of M&A deals. Our dataset also supports this finding, illustrated by Figures 12 and 13.  
For the studied period June 2014 – November 2017 oil production increased by 5.49% with 
average monthly increase of 0.14%.  
 
 
Figure 12. Number of M&A deals against monthly crude oil production 
 
Figure 13. Number of M&A deals against monthly crude oil production growth rate 
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Thus, we rephrase the initial H3 into:  
H3: The higher world crude oil production growth rate, the more M&A deals occur in the 
industry. 
 
Variable a: M&A monthly deal counts, retrieved from the dataset. 
Variable c: World crude oil production growth rate. Calculated as:  
(!"#$%&'(#)	#+	,-."	)/0!"#$&%'(#)	#+	,-."	) − 1) ∗ 100% 
The monthly data on world crude oil production, thousand barrels per day, is retrieved from 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and OPEC.    
Considering, that one of the major industry factors – world crude oil reserves – cannot be 
used due to limited time period of observation, the more dynamic market indicator is needed. We 
follow the proposition of Qiu and Zhou (2007), who claim that M&A may be driven by 
fundamentals or changes in supply and demand. We question whether amount of M&A deals in 
oil and gas industry relates to oil consumption. Given the fact that oil as energy source is facing 
increasing competition from the renewables, uncertainty around prospects of oil demand is 
rising. Transport sector dominates the global oil demand, however with vehicle efficiency 
improvements and greater penetration of alternative fuels makes growth of oil consumption 
shaky (BP Energy Outlook, 2018). The main assumption is that in the long-run oil and gas 
companies cannot be considered as attractive investments. The potential decline in global oil 
consumption makes companies assets less valuable for the potential buyers. Thus, we introduce 
the following hypothesis 
 
H4: The higher world crude oil consumption growth rate, the more M&A deals occur in the 
industry. 
 
Variable a: M&A monthly deal counts, retrieved from the dataset. 
Variable d: World crude oil consumption growth rate. Calculated as:  
(7#)8%9:'(#)	#+	,-."	)/07#)8%9:'(#)	#+	,-."	) − 1) ∗ 100% 
The monthly data on world crude oil consumption, thousand barrels per day, is retrieved from 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).   
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Finally, we question if amount of M&A deals relates to production and consumption 
balance. The extreme deviations from the balance can pull oil price up or down, which 
correspondingly influences asset value of oil company and its attractiveness to the investors. To 
theorize, when the production exceeds the consumption, the market faces oversupply that 
depreciates the commodity. According Ng and Donker (2013) the market should react with 
caution and reduce takeover activity until the uncertainty is resolved. 
We formulate H5 in the following way: 
 
H5: The higher world oil production and consumption balance, the less M&A deals occur 
in the industry 
 
Variable a: M&A monthly deal counts, retrieved from the dataset. 
Variable e: World crude oil production and consumption balance. Calculated as:  ;<=>?	@=A?B	<C>	D=<?A@EC<F' −;<=>?	@=A?B	<C>	@<FGAHDEC<F' 
where t is corresponding time period.  
 
Based on the previous researches, the factors that significantly influence the takeover 
activity in oil and gas industry and how they correspond with hypothesis set in this paper are 
summarized in Table 5.   
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Table 5. Factors that influence M&A activity in oil and gas industry and corresponding hypothesis 
 
Factor  Studied by H Final framing Variables 
Oil price  Boyer, Filion (2007) 
Ng, Donker (2013) 
H1 
The relationship between 
sharp decline of oil prices and 
M&A activity in oil and gas 
industry appears with a lagged 
affect 
a. M&A monthly 
deal counts 
b. Crude oil prices 
(Brent, WTI, average) Timing Sopta, Uremovic (2016) 
Henriques, Sadorsky 
(2011) 
Oil reserves 
Ng, Donker (2013) H2 
The higher level of world 
crude oil reserves, the more 
M&A deals occur in industry 
Rejected due to 
limitations of three-
year time period 
Production growth 
rate Hsu, Wright and Zhu 
(2017) 
H3 
The higher world crude oil 
production growth rate, the 
more M&A deals occur in the 
industry 
c. World crude oil 
production growth 
rate 
Consumption growth 
rate 
Taken into consideration 
as dynamic market 
indicator that can 
influence M&A activity 
in short-term period   
H4 
The higher world crude oil 
consumption growth rate, the 
more M&A deals occur in the 
industry 
d. World crude oil 
consumption growth 
rate 
Production and 
consumption balance 
H5 
The higher world oil 
production and consumption 
balance, the less M&A deals 
occur in the industry 
e. World crude oil 
production and 
consumption balance 
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Hypothesis testing method 
The hypotheses framing supposes that we are looking for ways to measure the strength of 
association between two variables and the direction of relationship. Thus, correlation test is the 
correct method to test our hypotheses. Correlation coefficient indicates the strength of 
relationship. Its value lies in a range between -1 and +1, where 1"#  indicates a perfect correlation 
between two variables, while 0 illustrates that there is no relationship observed. The sign of 
coefficient determines a direction of the relationship, where “+” sign stands for positive 
relationship (meaning variable move in tandem in one direction) and “-” sign indicates a negative 
one (variables move in different directions). The correlation coefficient distinguishes by strength 
(Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Strength of relationship  
-1.0 to -0.5 or 1.0 to 0.5 Strong 
-0.5 to -0.3 or 0.3 to 0.5 Moderate 
-0.3 to -0.1 or 0.1 to 0.3 Weak 
-0.1 to 0.1 None or very weak 
 
To decide which correlation test is appropriate, we followed decision tree provided by Field 
(2016). Our first step is to check whether variables meet the certain assumptions.  
 
Figure 14. General process for conducting correlation analysis 
Source. Field, 2016 
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As can be seen from Table 5 Variable a (M&A monthly deal counts) is constant through 
all the hypotheses. Thus, we check if Variable a meets the assumption of Pearson correlation. 
Here and after IBM SPSS Statistic is used as software for hypotheses testing.   
Assumption 1. The variable should be continuous. M&A monthly deal counts is measured 
by the amount of deals appeared in a corresponding month. The values vary from month to 
month and basically are not limited by exact value. Thus, Assumption 1 is met.   
Assumption 2. There should be no significant outliers. The boxplot from Appendix 3 
illustrates that case #13, representing 34 deals reported in June 2014, to be an outlier. 
Considering a nature of our dataset, the outlier cannot originate from data corruption rather it 
reflects the specific market situation. We are aware of the outlier; however, we do not remove it 
from the dataset. In this case, Assumption 2 is violated.  
Assumption 3. The variable should be approximately normally distributed. To check this 
assumption, we conducted test of normality. Since we have 42 observations in the dataset 
Shapiro-Wilk test will be a more appropriate indicator. The Sig. value is 0.014 greater than 0.05, 
so we can conclude that Variable a is approximately normal distribution. Assumption 3 is met.   
Since we cannot claim that all the assumptions for Person correlation test are met 
(Appendix 3), we decide to conduct a non-parametric Spearman correlation test instead. Here 
and after appendices may be addressed for IBM SPSS outputs.  
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Chapter 3. Empirical study 
3.1 Hypothesis testing 
   
H1: The relationship between sharp decline of oil prices and M&A activity in oil and gas 
industry appears with a lagged affect 
 
 To examine the lag in which companies react to the decline in oil prices, the monthly data 
of average crude oil price of Brent, Dubai and WTI (equally weighed); Brent crude oil spot price,  
West Texas Intermediate oil price, were taken for the period of June 2013 – November 2017. 
Data for M&A deals is taken on monthly basis for the period June 2014 – November 2017. The 
oil prices are intentionally taken since 2013 to time delays: 3, 6, 9 and 12 months. Although 
Spearman’s correlation does not require linear relationship, the function however should be 
monotonic (Field, 2016). We built scatterplots to test this assumption (Appendix 4). All price 
types have illustrated monotonic tendencies. Statistical analysis of variables revealed the 
following results.  
 Firstly, all oil price types showed similar correlation coefficient (Appendix 5), the 
strongest however is assigned to crude oil average prices. Spearman’s nonparametric correlation 
test showed moderate positive correlation between number of M&A deals and changes in the 
average oil prices with a lag of 3 months at 0.05 significance level. At same significance level 
moderate positive correlation was found with a lag of 12 months (r=0.336, n=42, p=0.029). This 
means, there is a relationship between oil prices and M&A deal count with a lag of 12 months. 
For example, if oil price is sharply decreasing the reaction of the company will react with M&A 
deal in 12 months after the low price is reported. Although, the test showed significant positive 
correlation between oil price without lag and number of M&A deals, we do not take this result 
into consideration, as company simply cannot react at glance. M&A deal is a complicated 
process, that requires certain time to arrange. The important notion is that a positive correlation 
was observed, suggesting when oil prices are plummeting, industry reacts with decrease in 
number of M&A deals. It comes in alignment with proposition of Henriques and Sadorsky 
(2011) who suggested that companies’ initial strategy is to wait until uncertainty is resolved. 
Thus, H1 is confirmed.       
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Table 7. Correlation between monthly number of M&A deals and lagged average crude oil 
prices 
 
 Oil price 
(average) 
N Spearman’s Rho Sig. 
Monthly 
number of 
M&A deals 
No lag 
42 
.496** .001 
3m lag .328* .034 
6m lag .224 .154 
9m lag .133 .401 
12m lag .336* .029 
  
* significant at the 0.05 level 
** significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
 
H3: The more world crude oil production growth rate, the more M&A deals occur in the 
industry. 
 
First, we check the assumption for monotonic function (Appendix 6). The assumption is 
met. Spearman’s nonparametric correlation test revealed moderate positive correlation between 
number of M&A deals and world crude oil production growth rate significant at 0.05 level 
(r=0.343, n=42, p=0.026).  Such a result is expected. In oil and gas industry there is a clear 
relationship between oil production and value of the company. The higher the oil production 
growth rate, the more valuable target the company becomes since the constant increase in output 
means increase in value of assets. H2 is confirmed.    
 
H4: The more world crude oil consumption growth rate, the more M&A deals occur in 
the industry 
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The first step is to check for assumption of monotonic function. However, scatterplot 
illustrated that assumption is violated (Figure 15). Thus, we cannot perform Spearman’s 
correlation test. The relationship between changes in consumption and number of M&A deals in 
the industry does not present. The possible explanation is that world oil demand growth remains 
stable. For 2016/2017 the growth was 1.6% (OPEC monthly report 2017). Indeed, the global oil 
consumption is important metrics of industry, however it does not correlate with volume of 
takeovers. H4 is rejected. 
 
Figure 15. Scatterplot illustrating absence of monotonic function between M&A deal 
counts and Oil consumption % change 
 
H5: The more world oil production and consumption balance, the less M&A deals occur 
in the industry 
 
Before running Spearman’s correlation test we check the assumption of monotonic 
function. Figure 16 shows that no monotonic function was found. The assumption is violated, 
meaning we cannot perform correlation test. We assume that during the years of low oil prices, 
the producers have put an effort to keep consumption and production balance, the data show 
production and consumption balance fluctuate around zero. H5 is rejected. 
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Figure 16. Scatterplot illustrating absence of monotonic function between M&A deal 
counts and Oil consumption and production balance 
 
We summarized the results of our empiric study in Table 6.   
 
Table 6. Hypothesis testing results 
 
Hypothesis  Framing Result 
H1 Sharp decline in oil prices has a lagged effect on M&A 
activity in oil and gas industry. 
Confirmed 
H2 The higher level of world crude oil reserves, the more 
M&A deals occur in industry 
Rejected 
H3 The more world crude oil production growth rate, the 
more M&A deals occur in the industry. 
Confirmed 
H4 The more world crude oil consumption growth rate, the 
more M&A deals occur in the industry 
Rejected 
H5 The more world oil production and consumption balance, 
the less M&A deals occur in the industry 
Rejected 
 
 
3.2 Discussion of results  
To proceed with the discussion of research results it is necessary to rewind our research 
questions. At the beginning of the paper we set the following research questions:  
Ø Does significant relationship between low oil prices and M&A activity in oil and gas 
industry take place?  
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Ø What other factors may be related to industry takeover activity?   
Ø Do different types of oil companies show distinct takeover behavior?  
 
Does significant relationship between low oil prices and M&A activity in oil and gas 
industry take place?  
Compared to the other industries, oil and gas industry is somewhat different. The 
takeover activity in the sector is influenced by industry specific factors, one of which is oil 
prices. We based our assumptions on rich theoretical background. Boyer and Filion (2007) have 
proved that value of oil and gas companies originates from oil price, a factor the firms cannot 
control. This was later supported by discover of Ng and Donker (2013), who stated that oil prices 
have a strong influence on takeover activity in O&G industry opposing to generally accepted 
view that stock prices are the major motivator. Valuable contribution to a discussion is that 
M&A activity in petroleum industry per se has a predictive power over oil returns and volatility, 
as it an indicator valuable of future expectations on oil price fluctuations (Bos et al., 2018). 
Our main proposition, however, was that industry specific shocks and M&A are related. 
In the previous researches the empirical evidence of such connection was found. For example, 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) define industry shock as expected or unexpected factor that 
provokes reshaping of industry structure, meaning takeover activity intensifies. We tested 
whether this might be true for oil and gas industry experiencing oil price shock. Our results have 
revealed a moderate positive correlation between M&A deal count and oil prices (with 12 
months lag). Positive correlation means, that despite our proposition, takeover activity in 
petroleum industry actually decreased following the decline of oil prices. This point is supported 
by findings of Henriques and Sadorsky (2011) who suggested that companies’ initial strategy is 
to wait until uncertainty is resolved. However, the researchers note, if unfavorable conditions 
preserve for a relatively long time periods, industry players revive their takeover activity. Based 
on these assumptions we expect M&A activity in petroleum industry to intensify in short-term 
period.      
What other factors may be related to industry takeover activity?   
Hsu, Wright & Zhu (2017) claim that oil prices is not the only industry specific variable 
that influences industry takeover activity. Although, commodity prices determine the value of 
company’s assets, their finding is that oil production has the positive effect on M&A activity. 
 46 
Results of our empirical research illustrate that there is a medium relationship M&A deal counts 
and world crude oil production growth rate. This can be explained by a fact that from company’s 
perspective the increased oil production is an indicator of increasing volume and value of firm’s 
assets. Another vitally important industry specific factor, namely world crude oil reserves, was 
declined due to the reason that for the studied period 2014-2016 world proven crude oil reserves 
increased only for 0.1%, which is unsubstantial changes. In a search for alternative variable 
proposition we addressed the study of Qiu and Zhou (2007) who claim M&A may be driven by 
changes in supply and demand. According to their empirical results, takeovers are means to 
stabilize the market, to restore the equilibrium. Since the supply side of equilibrium was already 
presented by changes in world crude oil output, we introduced changes in world crude oil 
consumption to stand for demand. Also, we introduced production and consumption balance as 
difference between the two. But these factors did not even meet the assumption of correlation 
analysis. The natural question is why?       
 Production and consumption balance is composed of two elements: supply and demand. 
Supply is regulated by OPEC members. Since the agreement of November 2016 cartel's key 
members has taken course towards production cut. The main goal behind the policy is to restore 
balance to the international oil market. Supply will gradually creep back in step with demand. 
More important, global oil inventories will be reduced, all taken to stimulate oil prices (Stratfor, 
2017). Meaning, world crude oil production and consumption balance will fluctuate around zero.  
The demand side of the equation, however presents a greater issue. It seems, that demand 
fluctuation does not influence expectations of the investors. Oil consumption is growing during 
the observed period, mainly driven by rapidly-growing emerging economies, like China. But in 
the developed countries oil is slowly replaced by other energy sources. The researchers discuss 
the prospect that global oil demand will gradually slow. However, the date at which oil demand 
will stop growing is highly uncertain and small changes in assumptions can lead to vastly 
different estimates. More importantly, there is little reason to believe that once oil consumption 
reaches its peak, that oil demand will fall sharply. The world is likely to demand large quantities 
of oil for many decades to come. Thus, oil is likely to grow less rapidly than other fuels, however 
these projections are highly uncertain (BP, 2017).   
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Do different types of oil companies show distinct takeover behavior?  
The answers to this question was provided by our dataset. While analyzing data for 655 
M&A deals in petroleum industry for the period of 2014 – 2017 we discovered the following 
findings.  
Ø State-owned oil companies or NOCs are not actively engaged in takeover activity 
during the period of extremely low oil prices. NOCs are responsible only for 46 
M&A deals in the industry. They mainly are involved in acquisition of upstream 
and midstream assets. This finding may be explained by the reasons that firstly, 
the value of this type of companies come from reserves. With oil price 
plummeting, the profitability of upstream operation decreases, limiting funds 
available for company expansion. Secondly, as was mentioned by Xie, Reddy, & 
Liang (2017) the previous highly favorable period of high oil prices led to 
extensive financing of national social programs. Currently NOCs still have to 
proceed with burden.  
Ø Mega-mergers come from majors. Despite IOCs are responsible for only 20 deals 
(approximately 3%) it is more than compensated by average deal value which is 
$74 billion. These deals are of different patterns and cover all segments across 
value chain, with preference in midstream operations. This is explained by 
industry composition. Since nationalization wave in 70’s in emerging economies, 
IOCs have lost access to low-cost crude oil reserves, which left this companies 
with limited growth opportunities in upstream.  
Ø Smaller players are in the process of restructuring. Approximately 90% of all 
reported M&A deals are accounted for independent players, at the same time their 
average deal value is around $9 billion, which is relatively small value, compared 
to that of IOCs. The activity of upstream and midstream segments suggests that 
low oil prices diminishes the profits of operations in these segments making them 
vulnerable to the external acquisition. 
Ø Midstream segment is gradually increasing its share. For the observed period the 
share of M&A deals occurring in the segment increased from 28 to 46%. The 
growing attractiveness of this segment suggests that in the context of low oil 
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prices companies are interested in obtaining latest technologies or facilities that 
will cut cost along value chain. 
Ø We also discovered multiple cases of diversification going beyond petroleum 
industry. This is supported by the argument of Granier and Podesta (2010) that 
one of M&A rationale is to achieve better competitive advantage is to acquire 
companies of different sectors.           
Theoretical contribution 
This research complement to the previous works by focusing on the context of low oil 
prices. We provide multi-dimensional analysis of takeover activity in oil and gas industry, 
namely by studying differences across various company types and industry value chain 
segments. This conducted complex study contributes to the understanding of response patterns of 
oil and gas companies to industry shock.      
Managerial implications  
While it was expected that takeover activity in oil and gas industry is related to oil prices, 
but when industry shock occurs the main question is How long will it take companies to react? 
In this study we provide the empirical evidence that oil and gas industry reacts to extremely low 
oil prices with lag of 12 months. M&A activity in the industry slows down revealing industry 
shock. By knowing this fact oil companies themselves or other market players can anticipate the 
actions of oil and gas companies in the context of unfavorable conditions, namely their natural 
reaction wait till uncertainty is resolved. In other words, it may help to stay ahead of competition 
by understanding the industry dynamics. Secondly, we discovered the response patterns of 
different company types. NOCs mostly remain ‘silent’ exposing their vulnerability and inability 
to project from oil shocks but trying to mitigate the losses by acquiring upstream and midstream 
assets. Smaller oil companies, on the contrary, show extremely high takeover activity indicating 
consolidation trends mainly by accumulating minor operation assets and fields. Majors go for 
midstream to increase their competitive advantages. These findings may help discover additional 
opportunities for partnership and collaboration in the industry. Thirdly, increasing M&A activity 
of midstream segment exposes the certain expectations regarding future industry development. 
Acquisition of these knowledge will contribute companies’ decision-making process.  
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Limitations of the study:  
Ø Time period. Although, three consecutive years of low oil prices represent the 
substantial industry shock for companies to react, however the responses and 
industry dynamic may be different for longer periods of unfavorable conditions.  
Ø We take into consideration oil prices as one of the factor that correlates with M&A 
deal counts. However, many countries also operate on gas market. Even though gas 
price is following the oil prices, it may also influence the company’s decision to 
acquire.  
Ø In this research we consider only fundamental factors (supply and demand) to be 
related to takeover activity in the industry, while other factors (e.g. level of crude oil 
inventories) may also report correlation.  
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Conclusion 
Since mid 2014 one of the most rapid and sharp decline of oil prices is observed. The 
experts still have not reached consensus regarding the reasons behind current oil price shock, but 
fact remains unchanged, low oil prices correlate with M&A activity in petroleum industry. 
Discussing particularities of takeover activity in oil and gas industry, the academics have agreed 
on that industry specific factors have much more significance. Such factors are oil price 
volatility, world crude oil reserves, crude oil production level, etc.  
Our research problem was formulated as follows: How do different types of oil 
companies use M&A to respond to low oil prices? The primary interest of this research is to 
analyze how national and international oil and gas companies (NOCs, IOCs and private oil 
companies) use takeover to react to low international oil price. We based our research on 
assumption that M&A is means for oil companies to respond to the market alterations caused by 
oil price decline.  
We conducted a study of 655 M&A deals in oil and gas industry for the period of June 
2014 – November 2017. Our results showed that a moderate positive correlation exists between 
M&A deal count and oil prices (with 12 months lag). Positive correlation means, that takeover 
activity in petroleum industry actually decreased following the decline of oil prices. It means that 
companies’ initial strategy is to wait until uncertainty is resolved. However, we expect M&A 
activity in petroleum industry to intensify in short-term period. Regarding the other factors we 
assumed that fundamentals (or changes in supply and demand) will show significant results. We 
found empirical evidence that there is a medium relationship M&A deal counts and world crude 
oil production growth rate. The increased oil production is an indicator of increasing volume and 
value of firm’s assets and financial health of a company. Also, we introduced production and 
consumption balance as difference between the two. But these factors did not even meet the 
assumption of correlation analysis and thus are insignificant. 
Also, by analyzing our dataset, we found that: 1) NOCs are not actively engaged in 
takeover activity during the period of extremely low oil prices. NOCs do not actively participate 
in takeover activity and mainly target upstream and midstream operations; 2) mega-mergers 
come from majors, despite IOCs are responsible for only 20 deals (approximately 3%) it is more 
than compensated by average deal value which is $74 billion; 3) smaller players are in the 
process of restructuring and present interest in smaller fields. Midstream segment is becoming a 
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most active segment (share of M&A deals occurring increased from 28 to 46%). The growing 
attractiveness of this segment suggests that in the context of low oil prices companies are 
interested in obtaining latest technologies or facilities that will cut cost along value chain. The 
upstream was second most popular target. Based on the activity of these segments we assume 
that low oil prices diminish the profits of operations making companies vulnerable to the external 
acquisition.          
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1.  
Volume of M&A deals by acquiring country 
 
Country Deal counts % 
United States of America 285 43,5% 
Canada 91 13,9% 
China 34 5,2% 
Australia 23 3,5% 
United Kingdom 22 3,4% 
Netherlands 17 2,6% 
Russian Federation 14 2,1% 
France 12 1,8% 
Bermuda 11 1,7% 
South Korea 11 1,7% 
Singapore 10 1,5% 
Spain 8 1,2% 
Malaysia 7 1,1% 
Italy 6 0,9% 
Kazakhstan 6 0,9% 
Marshall Islands 6 0,9% 
Norway 6 0,9% 
Brazil 5 0,8% 
Germany 5 0,8% 
Japan 5 0,8% 
Indonesia 4 0,6% 
Cayman Islands 4 0,6% 
Mexico 4 0,6% 
United Arab Emirates 3 0,5% 
Switzerland 3 0,5% 
Chile 3 0,5% 
Curacao 3 0,5% 
Hong Kong, SAR China 3 0,5% 
Israel 3 0,5% 
Luxembourg 3 0,5% 
New Zealand 3 0,5% 
Saudi Arabia 3 0,5% 
 57 
British Virgin Islands 3 0,5% 
Argentina 2 0,3% 
Cyprus 2 0,3% 
Czech Republic 2 0,3% 
Denmark 2 0,3% 
Finland 2 0,3% 
India 2 0,3% 
Nigeria 2 0,3% 
Philippines 2 0,3% 
Turkey 2 0,3% 
Ukraine 2 0,3% 
Austria 1 0,2% 
Barbados 1 0,2% 
Bahamas 1 0,2% 
Hungary 1 0,2% 
Mauritius 1 0,2% 
Papua New Guinea 1 0,2% 
Portugal 1 0,2% 
Qatar 1 0,2% 
Sweden 1 0,2% 
Total 655 100% 
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Appendix 2.  
Volume of M&A deals by target country 
 
Country Deal counts % 
United States of America 292 45,1% 
Canada 94 14,5% 
China 35 5,4% 
Australia 20 3,1% 
United Kingdom 19 2,9% 
Russian Federation 13 2,0% 
Norway 12 1,9% 
Kazakhstan 9 1,4% 
France 8 1,2% 
South Korea 8 1,2% 
Germany 7 1,1% 
Spain 7 1,1% 
Netherlands 7 1,1% 
Singapore 7 1,1% 
Bermuda 6 0,9% 
Brazil 6 0,9% 
Italy 6 0,9% 
Malaysia 6 0,9% 
New Zealand 6 0,9% 
Denmark 5 0,8% 
India 4 0,6% 
Marshall Islands 4 0,6% 
Mexico 4 0,6% 
Chile 3 0,5% 
Hungary 3 0,5% 
Indonesia 3 0,5% 
Ireland 3 0,5% 
Japan 3 0,5% 
Ukraine 3 0,5% 
Argentina 2 0,3% 
Austria 2 0,3% 
Belgium 2 0,3% 
Bahrain 2 0,3% 
Finland 2 0,3% 
Hong Kong, SAR China 2 0,3% 
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Israel 2 0,3% 
Cayman Islands 2 0,3% 
Luxembourg 2 0,3% 
Nigeria 2 0,3% 
Philippines 2 0,3% 
Turkey 2 0,3% 
British Virgin Islands 2 0,3% 
South Africa 2 0,3% 
United Arab Emirates 1 0,2% 
Bulgaria 1 0,2% 
Switzerland 1 0,2% 
Cyprus 1 0,2% 
Czech Republic 1 0,2% 
Gabon 1 0,2% 
Kenya 1 0,2% 
Mauritius 1 0,2% 
Oman 1 0,2% 
Papua New Guinea 1 0,2% 
Poland 1 0,2% 
Portugal 1 0,2% 
Romania 1 0,2% 
Saudi Arabia 1 0,2% 
Sweden 1 0,2% 
Vietnam 1 0,2% 
Total 647 100,0% 
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Appendix 3.  
Variable a: testing assumptions 
 
 
 
 
Boxplot for Variable a indicating the presence of outlier 
 
 
Test of Normality of Variable a 
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Appendix 4.  
H1: testing for monotonic function. Boxplots for different types of oil price as follows (Average, 
Brent, WTI) 
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Appendix 5.  
H1: Spearman’s correlation test for oil prices different types of oil price as follows (Average, 
Brent, WTI) 
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Appendix 6.  
H2: Testing for assumption and Spearman’s correlation test for crude oil production growth rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
